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The End of Mandatory State Bars?
LESLIE C. LEVIN *
The country’s thirty-one mandatory state bar associations are facing an existential threat following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Janus v. ACSME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). In Janus, the Court considered
the constitutionality of compelling public employees to pay agency fees to a
labor union. In the process, the Court effectively upended the reasoning of
earlier Supreme Court precedent that enabled mandatory state bars to compel bar dues payments from objecting lawyers and expend dues to fund traditional bar functions. Mandatory state bars—which function both as regulators and as traditional bar associations—are now defending themselves
against claims in several states that compelled bar dues payments violate
lawyers’ First Amendment rights. This Essay considers whether these compelled payments are likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny post-Janus.
It focuses on the constitutional analysis outlined in Janus, with emphasis on
the question of whether the states’ interest in lawyer regulation and improving the quality of legal services can be achieved through alternative means
that are significantly less restrictive of lawyers’ associational freedom than
compelled bar dues payments. To answer this question, the Essay compares
the activities of the country’s mandatory and voluntary state bar associations along several dimensions. The comparison reveals that states with
mandatory bars are unlikely to be able to demonstrate that the states’ interests cannot be achieved through significantly less restrictive means.
While this result would be a loss for the legal profession, there could be
benefits for the public.
INTRODUCTION
The country’s mandatory state bars are facing an existential threat.
Mandatory (or “unified”) bars—to which lawyers are required to pay dues
and belong as a condition of bar licensure—are the most common form of
state bar organization in the United States. These bars work to advance lawyers’ interests while also performing some regulatory functions. For almost
one hundred years, they have withstood attacks on their constitutionality,
their spending, and their advocacy. 1 The United States Supreme Court has
Joel Barlow Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. © 2020, Leslie
C. Levin. I thank Eugene Volokh and Steven Kaplan for comments on an earlier draft of
this Essay. I am also grateful to Maryanne Daly-Doran, Tanya Johnson, Adam Mackie, and
Anne Rajotte for research assistance.
1
They have also endured almost universal criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Ralph
H. Brock, Giving Texas Lawyers Their Dues: The State Bar’s Liability Under Hudson and
Keller for Political and Ideological Activities, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 49 n.5 (1996) (citing
critical sources); Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept:
*
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twice upheld their constitutionality, analogizing to decisions in the labor
union context. 2 Yet the continued viability of the Supreme Court’s mandatory bar cases was thrown into serious question by the Court’s 2018 decision
in Janus v. AFSCME, which held that forcing public employees to subsidize
a union they chose not to join violated their free speech rights. 3 In Janus,
the Court expressly overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 4 which
the Court had previously relied on to conclude that mandatory bar dues
could constitutionally be used to fund activities germane to the goals of a
mandatory state bar. 5 Mandatory bars in several states are now defending
themselves against renewed claims that compelled dues and membership
violate lawyers’ First Amendment rights. 6 It is only a matter of time before
the Supreme Court reconsiders this issue.
In the United States, there are mandatory bars in thirty-one states
and the District of Columbia. 7 They are often established as state agencies
or as public corporations that are instrumentalities of the judiciary or the
state supreme court. 8 These bars typically handle some regulatory functions
such as admission, discipline, or other licensing requirements. In most other
respects, they perform the same functions as voluntary state bars. Both mandatory and voluntary state bars socialize lawyers into the norms of the legal
profession. They educate lawyers about changes in the law and support
them in their work. 9 They provide networking opportunities that promote
Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 6; Bradley A. Smith,
The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal
Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 37 (1994).
2
See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12, 17 (1990); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820, 842–43 (1961).
3
See 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018).
4
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
5
See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13–14.
6
See Marcia Coyle, US Supreme Court Ruling Fuels Suits Challenging Mandatory Bar
Fees, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:05 PM EST), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2019/02/14/us-supreme-court-ruling-fuels-suits-challenging-mandatory-bar-fees/
[https://perma.cc/34PV-45DV]. The Goldwater Institute has helped organize several of the
recent constitutional challenges. See The First Amendment and State Bar Associations,
GOLDWATER INST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org/first-amendment-bar-associations/
[https://perma.cc/W4EU-V987] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
7
See Laurel Terry, The Power of Lawyer Regulators to Increase Client and Public
Protection Through Adoption of a Proactive Regulation System, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 717, 798–801 (2016). After the article was published, the status of California’s state
bar changed. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 9.010(2) (2017); Frequently Asked Questions, STATE BAR OF
TEX.,
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Frequently_Asked_
Questions&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=42961
[https://perma.cc/23Q2-YQDW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020); History of the Bar, WASH.
STATE BAR ASS’N (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.wsba.org/about-wsba/who-weare/history-of-the-wsba [https://perma.cc/D4L4-GFT2].
9
See, e.g., Become a NYSBA Member, NYSBA, https://www.nysba.org/members/
[https://perma.cc/9PDX-3KVY] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020); For Our Members, FLA. BAR,
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professional and client development. They offer other membership benefits,
including discounts for professional and personal services. 10 They play a
significant role in the development and adoption of the law governing lawyers. They advocate for lawyers’ economic interests and seek to raise the
status of the profession. Both mandatory and voluntary state bars also
work—to varying degrees—to support the courts and improve the administration of justice.
Although lawyers have long debated whether they should be compelled to join state bars, there have been few efforts to closely study the
work of these organizations or to consider who benefits from them. 11 It is
critical to do so now, not only for public policy reasons, but because this
information is directly relevant to the question of whether compelled bar
dues are likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Part I of this Essay briefly
discusses the history of state bar associations in the United States and the
activities of modern state bar organizations. Part II describes some of the
litigation challenging the mandatory bars and the reasons why the Supreme
Court will likely reconsider the constitutionality of compelled dues payments in light of Janus. Part III identifies the ways in which the legal profession, the courts, and (to a lesser degree) the public, benefit from mandatory state bar organizations. It then considers the constitutional inquiry that
is seemingly required by Janus, which asks whether states with voluntary
bars are able to accomplish the same objectives as states with mandatory
bars. It reveals that if the Supreme Court carefully considers the facts about
state bar associations, the Court will likely conclude that the country’s mandatory state bars cannot collect bar dues from objecting lawyers.
I. STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS: HISTORICALLY AND TODAY
A. HISTORY

Modern bar associations did not appear in the United States until the
1870s. Elite lawyers formed exclusive bar associations such as the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
and the Chicago Bar Association to raise the status and competence of

https://www.floridabar.org/member/ [https://perma.cc/65G6-DL32] (last visited Mar. 11,
2020).
10
See, e.g., Member Benefits and Services, PA. BAR ASS’N, https://www.pabar.org/
site/For-Lawyers/Benefits [https://perma.cc/Z4MK-352R] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020);
Member Benefits and Services, STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Member_Benefits&Template=/memberbenefits/home.cfm
[https://perma.cc/34LG-NZ94] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
11
The most thorough effort occurred in the 1980s and focused primarily on a single state’s
bar. See Schneyer, supra note 1, at 5.

2020]

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

4

lawyers. 12 These voluntary bar associations quickly moved to regulate lawyers. 13 By the end of the nineteenth century, non-elite bar associations began to emerge on the state and local levels. In the early twentieth century,
some state bar associations were little more than “paper organizations.” 14
Voluntary state bar memberships ranged from 10%–30% of the bar. 15
Herbert Harley, a lawyer and newspaper editor, viewed low bar
membership as a problem. He founded the American Judicature Society in
1913 and began a crusade to gain acceptance of the idea of an “integrated”
state bar. 16 He envisioned a unified, self-governing body to which all lawyers would be required to pay dues and belong. 17 Harley argued that the
chief weakness of voluntary bar associations was “numerical,” with only a
fraction of lawyers belonging to state bar associations, thereby reducing
their lobbying potential. 18 He believed that a compulsory statewide association, well financed from dues and possessing the power to discipline members, could influence state legislatures far better than a voluntary, financially weak bar organization. 19
Mandatory bar proponents offered two additional arguments. First,
unified bars were beneficial for lawyers’ economic self-interests. 20 A unified bar that handled bar admission could restrict the number of lawyers. 21
It could also set minimum fee schedules. 22 Second, a mandatory bar was
good for the public. It was a means of gaining greater resources to raise the
quality of the profession and filling a regulatory vacuum. 23 Proponents argued that a unified bar would benefit the public “through improved professional standards; more effective discipline; a unified voice of expertise on
See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 44–45 (1989); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY,
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 64–
65 (1987).
13
See ABEL, supra note 12, at 46–49, 54, 68–69; HALLIDAY, supra note 12, at 68, 76;
MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 18–19 (1988).
14
ABEL, supra note 12, at 46. For example, the California Bar only had 500 members in
1920. Id.
15
Schneyer, supra note 1, at 8. Some larger city bar associations did considerably better.
See ABEL, supra note 12, at 45.
16
DAYTON D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 21, 30–31, 33 (1963). The idea came after
learning about the Law Society of Upper Canada, which included all Ottawa lawyers and
formulated standards for admission, discipline, and legal education. Id. at 33, 35; Schneyer,
supra note 1, at 9, 18.
17
MCKEAN, supra note 16, at 22.
18
Id. at 39–40.
19
Id. at 36. The rise of the mandatory state bar movement coincided with the rise of labor
unions in the United States, and some of the opponents characterized mandatory bars as
“closed shop[s]” of lawyers. Id. at 25–26.
20
Id. at 34, 36.
21
Id. at 34.
22
Smith, supra note 1, at 38.
23
See Schneyer, supra note 1, at 17–18.
12
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legal issues; and more effective fulfilment of the public obligation of the
bar, such as increasing the availability of legal services.” 24
In 1921, North Dakota became the first state to create a unified bar
through an act of its legislature. 25 Initially other states created mandatory
bars through legislative action, although their constitutionality at times
faced challenges. 26 Court orders establishing mandatory bars later supplanted the statutory method and had the advantages (for the bar) that the
associations were “set up where it [was] untouchable by executive or legislative action or by popular initiative” and its funds were “in no danger of
being captured” by either branch. 27 In addition, unless the court ordered
otherwise, the bar’s money could be “spent without regard to any financial
controls or reporting requirements that the state may impose upon other associations.” 28
State legislatures have mostly stayed out of the business of the mandatory state bars. One exception is in California, where the legislature has
exercised some oversight because the State Bar is statutorily required to
submit a proposed budget for legislative approval. 29 Another is Texas,
where the Sunset Act requires the legislature to review the State Bar’s activities every twelve years. 30 In most states, however, legislatures have left
oversight of the mandatory state bars to state supreme courts.
B. MODERN STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS

1. Mandatory State Bars
As noted, today, more than three-fifths of all state bars are mandatory bars. They have boards that oversee their activities. In some states, the
board is exclusively composed of state bar members, while in others, there
are a few non-lawyer board members. 31 Most mandatory state bars claim,

Smith, supra note 1, at 39.
MCKEAN, supra note 16, at 23.
26
See, e.g., id. at 85.
27
Id. at 48.
28
Id.
29
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6140.1 (West 2019).
30
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 325.001–325.015 (West 2019). Alaska’s legislature also
periodically reviews the state bar’s handling of its regulatory functions pursuant to sunset
legislation. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.66.050 (2019).
31
Compare STATE BAR OF MICH., BYLAWS art. III, § 3 (2020), https://www.michbar.org/
generalinfo/bylaws#3/ [https://perma.cc/4KNP-FGRP] (all-lawyer Board) with Board of
Governors, STATE BAR OF WIS., https://www.wisbar.org/aboutus/leadership/pages/boardof-governors.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z95D-QENH] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (three nonlawyer members on Board).
24
25
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to varying degrees, to serve both the profession and the public, 32 although
commentators have noted the incoherence of this approach. 33
Mandatory bars were initially empowered to administer a broad
range of regulatory functions, but many courts have since transferred some
of those functions to other state entities. Consequently, the remit of mandatory state bars differs significantly from state to state. Only eight mandatory
state bars retain some responsibility for both bar admission and discipline
in addition to other regulatory functions, such as administering the client
protection fund (“CPF”). 34 Sixteen other mandatory bars have some responsibility for administering either bar admission or lawyer discipline and other
regulatory activities. 35 Eight mandatory bars only perform limited regulatory functions, such as administering the CPF, fee dispute arbitration, or
mandatory continuing legal education (“CLE”). 36 The state bars employ
professional staff to perform much of the regulatory work. 37
Mandatory state bars have considerable power to influence the law
governing lawyers. In some states, their role is baked into state law. The
Oregon State Bar Board of Governors, with the approval of the state bar’s
House of Delegates, has the statutory power to formulate rules of professional conduct for adoption by the Supreme Court. 38 The Oregon Supreme
Court cannot “formulate” rule changes, but justices sometimes work with
State Bar committees that draft proposed amendments. 39 Some other mandatory state bars also have the statutory power to formulate rules governing
See, e.g., About, Values and Responsibilities, ALA. STATE BAR, https://www.alabar.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/CN6Z-FDB3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (noting the State Bar
“has long served as a dual advocate for the profession and the public”); Arizona State Bar
Mission, Vision and Core Values, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., https://azbar.org/about-us/missionvision-core-values/ [https://perma.cc/Q8MH-7NHJ] (“The State Bar of Arizona exists to
serve and protect the public with respect to the provision of legal services and access to
justice.”).
33
See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 1, at 6.
34
See Terry, supra note 7, at 798–801. For some states, the information was updated based
on information available on state bar websites.
35
Id. Their disciplinary responsibilities range from the investigation and prosecution of
complaints in some jurisdictions, to the decisionmaking and imposition of sanctions in
others. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/professional-discipline/office-ofdisciplinary-counsel [https://perma.cc/LSV8-25S5]; Roadmap of the Disciplinary Process,
N.C. STATE BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/lawyer-discipline/roadmap-of-the-disciplinaryprocess/ [https://perma.cc/GQ4U-WXAM] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
36
See Terry, supra note 7, at 798–801.
37
See, e.g., UTAH STATE BAR, 2018–2019 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 4 (2019),
https://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/20182019_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/49XU-JBEL].
38
OR. REV. STAT. § 9.490(1) (2018).
39
See Edwin J. Peterson, Lawyer-Client Conflicts of Interest Law: Contributions of Chief
Justice Wallace P. Carson, Jr. During a Time of Dynamic Change, 43 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 527, 528, 535–36 (2007).
32
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lawyers, subject to the approval of their supreme courts. 40 In other states,
proposed rule changes regularly emanate from the mandatory state bars, or
state supreme courts seek the bars’ input when considering such changes. 41
Although there do not appear to be studies indicating how often state courts
adopt the mandatory bars’ proposals, the courts frequently do so. 42
Mandatory state bars typically self-fund, with most money coming
from bar dues and associated fees, and from paid bar activities and publications. 43 Where the state bars handle admission to practice, fees charged to
bar applicants fund the cost of that regulation. 44 Mandatory bar dues and
associated fees (for example, CPF payments) range from a low of $240 to a
high of $660. 45
For reasons discussed in Part II, compelled dues payments to state
bars raise First Amendment concerns. Consequently, these bars often avoid
advocacy on issues unrelated to the regulation of the legal profession, the
quality of legal services, or the administration of justice. This sometimes
includes a reluctance to be seen as speaking out to defend an independent
judiciary. 46 Some mandatory state bars will not support or oppose legisSee, e.g., 2006 ALA. CODE § 34-3-43(3) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-21, 84-23(a)
(2019).
41
See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of Lawyer Regulation: The Case of Malpractice
Insurance, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2020); N. Gregory Smith, Missed
Opportunities: Louisiana’s Version of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 61 LA. L. REV.
1, 7 (2000); Betsy Brandborg, Revising the MRPC, MONT. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 16.
42
See, e.g., Heather Perry Baxter, 2006 Changes to the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct, 31 NOVA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (adopting bar’s rule proposals); Smith, supra note
41, at 8–10, 14–18 (same); State Bar News: New CLE Rules Adopted, MONT. LAW., Feb.
2001, at 21 (same). But see, e.g., Levin, supra note 41, at 48; Schneyer, supra note 1, at
19–20.
43
See, e.g., ALA. STATE BAR, supra note 32; About the Oregon State Bar, OR. STATE BAR,
https://www.osbar.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/U2BN-SKKC] (last visited Mar. 1,
2020).
44
See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, WSBA BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPT.
30, 2019, at 2–3, 18 (2018), https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/aboutwsba/finance/fy-2019-budget-(10-8-18)-final.pdf?sfvrsn=a03901f1_0
[https://perma.cc/ZH7C-PXQ8].
45
See Dues and Payments, ALASKA BAR ASS’N, https://alaskabar.org/for-lawyers/statusinformation-dues/bar-dues/ [https://perma.cc/PN5K-VQP6] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020);
Dues FAQ, NEB. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.nebar.com/page/DuesFAQ [https://
perma.cc/4WV7-9XQP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
46
Robert J. Derocher, Bars Support the Judiciary and Separation of Powers, B. LEADER
(Nov.–Dec. 2006), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_
leader/2006_07/3102/separation/ [https://perma.cc/96NS-M92A] (noting Montana Bar
constrained from publicly supporting ballot initiative designed to limit judicial
independence); Robert J. Derocher, Campaigning for Justice: Bars Support Judiciary,
Tackle Tough Issues in Election 2012, B. LEADER (Jan.–Feb. 2013), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2012_13/january_february/
campaigning_justice_bars_support_judiciary_tackle_tough_issues_election_2012/
[https://perma.cc/T2GZ-6LUY] [hereinafter Derocher, Campaigning for Justice]
40
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lation unless it pertains to the bar’s mission. 47 Still others will allow committees to make legislative proposals so long as those committees do not
use bar dues in the process. 48 A few permit more advocacy when the issue
is of great public interest or when the majority of the bar votes to support
it. 49
2. Voluntary State Bars
Voluntary state bars are composed of some portion of the state’s licensed lawyers. The Delaware State Bar Association is on the high end,
with as many as 86% of the active lawyers licensed to practice in Delaware
belonging to that bar. 50 Almost two-thirds of the lawyers licensed to practice in Colorado and Vermont belong to their states’ voluntary bars. 51 But
in other states with voluntary state bars, such as New York, less than half
of the lawyers admitted to practice there are members. 52 In Connecticut and
(describing limits on Florida Bar’s efforts to oppose ballot initiative affecting high court
appointments).
47
See, e.g., KY. BAR ASS’N, LEGISLATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURE 1.14 (a)(1) (2019); MO.
BAR, POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES (2012); OKLA. BAR
ASS’N, BYLAWS art. VIII (2018), https://www.okbar.org/bylaws/ [https://perma.cc/B8GZ23LR]. Other mandatory bars will not take positions on legislation, but will provide
legislatures with information or advice about their proposals. See, e.g., STATE BAR OF ARIZ.,
BYLAWS art. X, § 10.02; Legislation Program, N.H. BAR ASS’N, https://www.nhbar.
org/helpful-links-for-nh-attorneys/legislation-program/ [https://perma.cc/KM8A-6GCC]
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
48
See, e.g., FLA. BAR, STANDING BOARD POLICIES: OPERATIONAL POLICIES OF THE
FLORIDA BAR 48–51 (2020), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2020/02/2020_07JAN-SBPs-1-31-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J8Q-3EVX]; Public Policy Resource Center,
STATE BAR OF MICH., https://www.michbar.org/publicpolicy/Home [https://perma.cc/
JA6G-3ACK] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
49
See, e.g., MONT. BAR, POLICIES OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 3-102, 3-103 (2018),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.montanabar.org/resource/resmgr/attorney_rules_and_
regulations/policies_of_the_board.pdf [https://perma.cc/65R4-AFGW].
50
See E-mail from Lisa Dolph, Clerk of Del. Supreme Court to Tanya Johnson, Reference
Librarian, Univ. of Conn. Law Sch. (Oct. 10, 2019, 10:04 EDT) (on file with author); Email from LaTonya Tucker, Dir. of Bar Services & Membership, Del. State Bar Ass’n, to
author (Oct 7, 2019, 17:09 EDT) (on file with author). The percentage is approximate
because some of the lawyer-members of the state bar association may not be licensed in
Delaware.
51
See, e.g., Colorado Bar Association Quick Facts & Tip Sheet, COLO. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.cobar.org/About-the-CBA/News-Media/Quick-Facts-Tip-Sheet
[https://perma.cc/DG4Z-2RRN] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (stating that 66% of active
Colorado lawyers belong to state bar). About 66% of Vermont’s licensed lawyers belong
to the Vermont Bar Association. See E-mail from Therese Corsones, Exec. Dir., Vt. State
Bar Ass’n, to author (July 6, 2019, 13:18 EDT) (on file with author); E-mail from Andrew
R. Strauss, Vt. Judiciary Office of Licensing, to author (July 8, 2019, 11:37 EDT) (on file
with author).
52
See E-mail from Maria Kroth, NYSBA Member Dev. Assistant, to Anne Rajotte, Head
of Reference Servs., Univ. of Conn. Law Sch. (Jan. 16, 2020, 11:28 EST) (on file with
author); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2019),
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Illinois, not even half of the lawyers with in-state addresses belong to their
voluntary state bars. 53
Some lawyers’ willingness to join voluntary state bar associations is
no doubt influenced by the cost. Lawyers in states with voluntary state bars
must still pay state lawyer licensing fees ranging from approximately $190
to $545 annually. 54 These fees fund the cost of lawyer regulation (such as
lawyer discipline) by state entities. 55 Voluntary state bar dues are additional
discretionary expenditures. On the high end, the combined cost of lawyer
licensing and voluntary state bar dues in a few jurisdictions exceeds $750
annually. 56 Voluntary state bars compete with local, specialty, and affinity
bar associations for members, and in recent years, some state bars have seen
a drop in membership. 57
Unlike mandatory bars, the missions of the voluntary state bars focus primarily on lawyers’ interests and secondarily on improving the administration of justice. Public protection is not a stated priority. 58 For

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/nationallawyer-population-by-state-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YTF-7ENV].
53
See E-mail from Michael P. Bowler, Conn. Statewide Bar Counsel, to author (Dec. 18,
2019, 07:50 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Towanda Sanders, Member Servs.
Specialist, Conn. Bar Ass’n, to author (July 9, 2019, 09:18 EDT) (on file with author); ILL.
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2018, at 8–10
(2019), https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QKR-S4CX];
About the ISBA, ILL ST. BAR ASS’N, https://www.isba.org/about [https://perma.cc/53GP6WTZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
54
See Attorney Regulation, Annual Fee, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Attorneys/Attorney-Regulation [https://perma.cc/SWS9-7TW2] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)
(describing annual license fees of $544); The Legal Profession - Attorney Registration,
NYCOURTS.GOV, https://ww2.nycourts.gov/attorneys/registration/index.shtml [https://
perma.cc/HL4A-4XL2] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (indicating biannual registration fee of
$375).
55
See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2017 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS chart VII (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
2017sold-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8XV-TRZQ]. The exception is New York, where
lawyer discipline is funded by the legislature. Id.
56
For example, combined dues and licensing fees in Illinois for lawyers admitted eleven
or more years total $765. See Membership, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.isba.org/
membership/join [https://perma.cc/T8JS-T2NY] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (select
“Lawyer”; then select “Yes”); 2020 Registration Fee Schedule, ILL. ATTORNEY
REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM’N,
https://registration.iardc.org/attyreg/
Registration/Registration_Department/Fee_Schedule/Registration/regdept/2020_Fee_
Schedule.aspx?hkey=1506dee5-35f5-4172-ba9f-efc27efd5c52 [https://perma.cc/8NADHHS4].
57
See, e.g., Susan Desantis, As Baby Boomers Retire, New York Bar Associations Face
Harsh Realities, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2019, at 1.
58
The exception is public protection from the unauthorized practice of law, which also
benefits lawyers. See, e.g., About the DSBA, DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N,
https://www.dsba.org/about-the-dsba/ [https://perma.cc/TH2H-8AF8] (last visited Mar. 8,
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example, the Arkansas Bar Association “represents its members’ interests,
provides money-saving services, promotes the profession, and alerts members to the issues created by proposed legislation that affect their law practice.” 59 The California Lawyers Association is “a member-driven, missionfocused organization dedicated to the professional advancement of attorneys practicing in the state of California.” 60 The New Jersey State Bar Association is the “voice of New Jersey attorneys” and its mission is, in part,
“[t]o serve, protect, foster and promote the personal and professional interests of its members.” 61 Some have political action committees that advocate
for lawyers’ interests. 62
Voluntary state bar associations typically have no legally prescribed
role in proposing to courts regulations relating to lawyers. Nevertheless,
they often have committees that work on these issues, and in some states,
they initiate regulatory changes. For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court generally does not initiate ethics rule changes, 63 but instead, the Pennsylvania Bar Association does so. Its proposals are then considered by the
Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Board. 64 Other voluntary state bar associations will also make proposals or offer their views in response to rule
changes proposed by courts or court-constituted committees. 65 Courts vary
in their willingness to accede to the views of voluntary state bars. 66
2020) (stating that state bar works to protect the public from those engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law).
59
Welcome to the Arkansas Bar Association, ARK. BAR ASS’N, https://www.arkbar.
com/home [https://perma.cc/9AJ4-2QNP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
60
About CLA, CAL. LAW. ASS’N, https://calawyers.org/cla/about-cla/ [https://perma.cc/
6XWN-4L36] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
61
About Us, N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://tcms.njsba.com/PersonifyEbusiness/AboutUs.
aspx [https://perma.cc/3MLS-6UP4] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
62
See, e.g., PABAR-PAC, PA. BAR ASS’N, https://www.pabar.org/site/For-Lawyers/
Committees-Commissions/PABAR-PAC [https://perma.cc/WB52-37DR] (last visited Mar.
1, 2020).
63
See E-mail from Thomas Wilkinson, Jr., former chair of Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics &
Professional Responsibility Comm., to author (Dec. 14, 2019, 16:08 EST) (on file with
author).
64
See, e.g., Christopher Lilienthal, A Comprehensive Overhaul of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, PA. L. WEEKLY, Aug. 4, 2003, at 5; Natalie Klyashtorny, Proposed Amendment
to Rule 8.4: How Will It Impact Diversity and Inclusion, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (June 27,
2017), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/06/27/
proposed-amendment-to-rule-8-4-how-will-it-impact-diversity-and-inclusion/
[https://perma.cc/8HS2-443N].
65
See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws and Some
Options for Their Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 303, 309 (2004); Levin, supra note 41, at 48
(describing New Jersey State Bar Association’s opposition to proposal by court-appointed
committee).
66
See, e.g., Patrick M. Connors, Transition to the “New” New York Rules of Professional
Conduct, N.Y. L.J., May 18, 2009, at 3; Jay Stapleton, Judges Vote to Allow Lawyers to
Represent Medical Marijuana Growers, CONN. L. TRIB. (June 26, 2014), https://www.law.
com/ctlawtribune/almID/1202661028491/ [https://perma.cc/G7CD-AQQU].
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Voluntary state bars are sometimes more willing than mandatory
bars to defend judicial independence. 67 They are freer to advocate on issues
affecting their clients and the public. They often draft and support a broad
range of legislation. 68 For example, the Delaware State Bar Association
drafts most of the state’s corporate legislation. 69 These bars also advocate
in other ways. The New York State Bar Association joined an amicus brief
urging the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down restrictions on same-sex marriage. 70 Voluntary state bars have also urged the government to address climate change and have called for increased protections for immigrants. 71
Nevertheless, not all voluntary state bars engage in this sort of advocacy.
Voluntary state bars may be unable to reach agreement on initiatives because their members are ideologically diverse and represent clients on both
sides of an issue. 72 They risk losing members if they take public positions
with which some members disagree.
II. LITIGATION OVER MANDATORY STATE BARS
As Professor Theodore Schneyer observed thirty-five years ago,
“lawyers have ceaselessly debated whether they should be compelled to belong to an official statewide bar organization, how such organizations
should be governed, and what their activities should be.” 73 This remains
true today. The chief objections to compelled membership are based on
freedom of association and freedom of speech grounds.

See, e.g., Derocher, Campaigning for Justice, supra note 46 (describing actions of the
voluntary Ohio and Iowa state bars); Resolution of the New Jersey State Bar Association:
Supporting the New Jersey Judiciary as a Co-Equal Branch of Government, N.J. STATE
BAR ASS’N (Mar. 17, 2016), https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/Portals/0/NJSBAPDF/Resolutions/judiciary%20resolution%20March%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8TD-WYBF].
68
See, e.g., Our Legislative Program, IOWA STATE BAR ASS’N (Jan, 28, 2020),
https://www.iowabar.org/page/Legislative [https://perma.cc/TF7V-MA37].
69
See Minor Myers, How Delaware Makes Its Corporate Law 17, 20–22 (Nov. 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
70
New York State Bar Association Joins Amicus Briefs on Same-Sex Marriage Cases
Before U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.nysba.
org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=951 [https://perma.cc/GKV7-H636].
71
See, e.g., PBA House of Delegates Approves Resolution for Government Action on
Climate Change, PA. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.pabar.org/public/news%
20releases/pr112515.asp [https://perma.cc/S9K9-772B]; Resolution, MASS. BAR ASS’N
(2017),
https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-source/publications-document-library/
ejournal/2017-18/massbar-immigration-resolution-final-012617-docx---massbarimmigration-resolution-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/593F-U3BT].
72
See, e.g., Kelly Glista & Edmund H. Mahony, Bar Association Vote on Gun Control
Support Ruled a Tie; Group Won’t Join Case, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 20, 2014),
https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-cba-newtown-voting-0821-20140820story.html [https://perma.cc/3Z7A-M8MK].
73
Schneyer, supra note 1, at 1–2.
67

2020]

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

12

A. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS ON MANDATORY STATE BARS

In 1961, the United States Supreme Court addressed some of these
arguments in Lathrop v. Donohue, when it rejected a claim by a Wisconsin
lawyer that he could not constitutionally be compelled to join and support a
state bar association which expressed opinions on, and attempted to influence, legislation. 74 The Court relied on its prior decision in Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, in which it had found that the Railway Labor Act did not abridge railroad employees’ rights of association by authorizing agreements that effectively conditioned employees’ continued employment on the payment of union dues. 75
Almost thirty years later, in Keller v. State Bar of California, the
Supreme Court considered a claim that use of petitioners’ mandatory State
Bar dues to finance certain ideological or political activities to which they
did not subscribe violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 76
The State Bar had used a portion of bar dues to lobby or speak on issues
such as gun control, school prayer, and abortion. 77 The Court observed that
Lathrop only decided the issue of whether a lawyer could be compelled to
pay bar dues and reserved judgment on the free speech claims. 78 The Keller
Court noted the “substantial analogy” between the relationship of the State
Bar and its members and employee unions and their members. 79 Both faced
the possibility that free riders would benefit from union or state bar activities if they were not required to pay their fair share. 80
The Keller Court also discussed its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, in which it held that agency shop dues that nonunion public employees were required to pay to a public employees’ union
could not, consistent with the First Amendment, be used to fund the expression of political views or the advancement of ideological causes not germane to the union’s duties as the collective bargaining representative. 81 Relying on Abood, the unanimous Keller Court held that the State Bar could
constitutionally use bar dues to fund activities related to the goals of regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. Compulsory dues could not, however, be expended to endorse or advance other
367 U.S. 820, 842–43 (1961).
Id. (citing Railway Emps.’ Dep’t. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)). In Hanson, the Court
had noted, “[o]n the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First
Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required
to be a member of an integrated bar.” 351 U.S. at 238.
76
496 U.S. 1, 4, 6 (1990).
77
Id. at 15.
78
Id. at 9.
79
Id. at 12.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 9–10 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977)).
74
75
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political or ideological issues. 82 It also found that mandatory bar associations must establish procedures for allowing members to challenge expenditures not related to the goals of regulation of the profession and improving
the quality of legal services. 83 The portion of bar dues used for such purposes must be refunded to objecting members.
B. JANUS AND ITS AFTERMATH

In 2018, the United States Supreme Court seemingly upended the
reasoning underlying Keller when it overruled Abood in Janus v.
AFSCME. 84 In its 5-4 decision, the Janus Court considered whether an Illinois statute which forced public employees to pay agency fees to a union
that took collective bargaining and other positions with which petitioners
disagreed violated their First Amendment rights by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern. 85 It found
that compelling a person to subsidize speech of other private speakers raises
First Amendment concerns and applied “exacting scrutiny” in judging the
constitutionality of compelled agency fees. 86 The Court explained that exacting scrutiny requires that a compelled subsidy of speech must “serve a
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” 87 When applying that
standard, the Court found that the state’s compelling interest in “labor peace”
could be readily achieved “through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms than assessment of agency fees.” 88 It pointed to the
federal Postal Service employment experience, which it believed demonstrated that an exclusive union representative can work effectively for employees without assessing agency fees. 89 Finding Abood “poorly reasoned,”
unworkable in the distinctions it drew between chargeable and nonchargeable union expenditures, and inconsistent with the Court’s other First
Amendment cases, the majority overruled it. 90 It concluded that public secId. at 13–14. In what proved to be an understatement, the Court noted that “[p]recisely
where the line falls” between activities the bar could fund with compulsory bar dues and
political or ideological activities “will not always be easy to discern.” Id. at 15.
83
Id. at 16.
84
See 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
85
Agency fees are a percentage of union dues charged to employees who decline to join
the union. Id. at 2460.
86
Id. at 2464–65. “Exacting scrutiny” lies between the difficult-to-meet strict scrutiny
standard and the more relaxed standard for commercial speech. Id. at 2465. The Janus
Court did not decide whether strict scrutiny should be applied because it concluded that the
statutory scheme at issue could not even survive exacting scrutiny. Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 2466 (quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 648–49 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
89
Id. at 2465–66. While the Court assumed that “labor peace” was a compelling state
interest, it rejected arguments that avoiding free riders was a compelling interest. Id. at
2466.
90
Id. at 2460, 2481.
82
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tor unions were no longer allowed to extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. 91
Not long thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fleck v.
Wetch, in which the Eighth Circuit, relying on Keller, had rejected petitioner’s claim that North Dakota’s mandatory state bar violated his freedom
not to associate and not to subsidize speech with which he disagreed. 92 The
Supreme Court vacated the decision in Fleck and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Janus. 93 In August 2019, the Eighth Circuit
again ruled for the defendants, essentially on procedural grounds. 94 This
was only a temporary reprieve for the mandatory bars, which are still facing
constitutional challenges in Louisiana, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin based on the reasoning in Janus. 95
Professors William Baude and Eugene Volokh have argued that Janus likely signals the end of mandatory bar dues payments, 96 while Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk disagree. 97 The latter note that
Baude and Volokh “ignore the Supreme Court’s . . . reasoning” in Harris v.
Quinn, which it decided four years earlier. 98 In Harris, the Court held that
the First Amendment prohibited the collection of agency fees from objecting individuals who were not full-fledged public employees. 99 In dictum, it
rejected the argument that invalidating agency fees for unions put mandatory state bars dues payments in constitutional jeopardy. The Court explained that mandatory dues serve a compelling government purpose, which
includes the “State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services” and “a strong interest in allocating to the
members of the bar, rather than the general public, the expense of ensuring
that attorneys adhere to ethical practices.” 100
Id. at 2486.
868 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2017).
93
See Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018).
94
Fleck v. Wetch, 937 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL 1124433 (mem.)
(Mar. 9, 2020) (No. 19-670). The court concluded that Fleck had not properly preserved a
constitutional freedom of association claim or adequately developed the record for such a
claim. Id. at 1116.
95
See GOLDWATER INST., supra note 6; Thomas Franz, First Amendment Lawsuit Filed
Against State Bar, MICH. LAWS. WKLY (Sept. 4, 2019), https://milawyersweekly.com/
news/2019/09/04/first-amendment-lawsuit-filed-against-state-bar/
[https://perma.cc/AE6F-JNMX]. Indeed, a petition for certiorari in the Wisconsin case is
pending in the Supreme Court. See Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis., No. 19-3444 (7th Cir.
order filed Dec. 23, 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 31, 2019) (No. 19-831).
96
See, e.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First
Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 196 (2018).
97
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply to
Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42 (2018).
98
Id. at 55 (discussing Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014)).
99
573 U.S. at 646–47, 657.
100
Id. at 655 (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990)).
91
92
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The Harris dictum provides reason to believe that the Supreme
Court may attempt to distinguish mandatory bar dues from agency fees paid
to unions when it revisits the constitutionality of compelled bar dues in light
of Janus. Chemerinsky and Fisk correctly observe that Harris suggests that
mandatory state bars should be able to demonstrate a compelling state interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services. 101 Those bars may also be able to show a compelling state interest
in allocating to lawyers, “rather than the general public, the expense of ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices.” 102 But if the Court carefully considers the alternatives to compelled payments—as it did in Janus—
mandatory bars are unlikely to be able to show that the states’ interests cannot “be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms” than compelled dues payments to mandatory bars. 103
III. THE BENEFITS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY STATE BARS
This section seeks to address two questions. First, who benefits from
mandatory state bars and in what ways? This question is important for
courts to consider when deciding how hard they should work to preserve
mandatory state bar dues payments. And second, can compelled dues payments to state bars survive the constitutional scrutiny that Janus seemingly
requires?
A. WHO BENEFITS FROM MANDATORY STATE BARS?

Just as Herbert Harley anticipated over a century ago, lawyers are
the primary beneficiaries of mandatory state bars. In addition to the educational, networking, and other benefits these bars provide, some exercise
considerable control over lawyer discipline and other regulatory processes.
They are a “powerful voice for lawyers” that help ensure that the profession
continues to be deeply involved in its own regulation. 104 Mandatory bars
may enable lawyers to lobby for lawyers’ interests even more effectively
than voluntary bars because of their size, stature, and financial resources.
Moreover, the state bars’ official or quasi-official role in the rulemaking
process often allows them to set the rulemaking agenda and define the scope
of the issues they will study. 105 Bar leaders can also exert control by determining who serves on the committees that consider the issues. Mandatory
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 97, at 55–56.
Harris, 573 U.S. at 655–56.
103
Id. at 648–49.
104
Jorge Aquino, Gloves-Off Bar Brawl, THE RECORDER, May 17, 1996, at 1; see also Trey
Apffel, A Structure Worth Defending, 82 TEX. B.J. 312, 312 (2019) (arguing that through
a mandatory bar “we are able to gather our collective might to advance and improve the
legal profession”).
105
This is not uniformly true. In Rhode Island, the supreme court sometimes creates its
own committee to review the rules of professional conduct. See Thomas W. Lyons,
Confidentiality, R.I. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2006.
101
102
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bars can prevent proposals that benefit the public from ever proceeding to
the courts for consideration. 106
State supreme courts also benefit from mandatory state bars. Supreme court justices are busy with their main work—deciding cases—and
may lack the time to carefully oversee the operation of regulatory activities
such as lawyer admission and discipline. They may also lack the time and
resources to do their own fact-gathering on issues relating to lawyer regulation. 107 They often depend on the bars to gather facts, analyze issues, and
make recommendations concerning lawyer regulation. 108 When mandatory
bars routinely handle these tasks, they relieve the courts of the need to initiate action, appoint committees, or use judicial resources for factfinding
and preliminary rule drafting. Moreover, by working together to regulate
the legal profession, courts and lawyers both benefit by deterring state legislatures from seeking to regulate lawyers, thereby preserving the courts’
power and prerogatives. 109
And what about the public? If we put to one side the regulatory functions that mandatory bars perform, the public derives comparable benefits
from mandatory and voluntary state bars. Both types of organizations help
raise the quality of legal services and promote access to justice. The public
also benefits from the state bars’ close connection to the courts, which helps
preserve the legal profession’s independence from the state. This independence enables lawyers to defend democratic institutions and the rule of law.
Yet the close connection between the court and the bar is potentially a double-edged sword: it may also cause judges to approach lawyer regulation in
ways that benefit lawyers at the public’s expense. 110
Judges tend to decide many issues in ways that favor lawyers. 111
Judges—like all people—identify with and lean toward helping people who
are like them. 112 This is especially true in the context of lawyer regulation,
where there are rarely interest groups that are advocating for the public’s
This is sometimes also true of voluntary state bars, but mandatory bars are often betterpositioned to do this.
107
See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1207 (2003).
108
See, e.g., Levin, supra note 41, at 33, 57–58.
109
This explains, in part, why supporters of mandatory state bars warn that elimination of
these bars may carry “a very substantial risk of increased legislative involvement in the
regulation of lawyers.” Aquino, supra note 104.
110
See, e.g., Levin, supra note 41, at 57 (describing Texas Supreme Court’s rejection of
malpractice insurance disclosure rule that State Bar of Texas opposed).
111
BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1
(2011).
112
See MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING 125 (7th ed. 2009).
106
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interests. State bars—whether they are voluntary or mandatory—sometimes
support proposals that favor lawyers over the public. 113 Courts in states with
mandatory bars may be even more willing to defer to the state bars’ proposals than are courts in states with voluntary state bars. Mandatory bars
have greater legitimacy because they are often considered agencies or instrumentalities of the judiciary and ostensibly represent all the state’s lawyers. Their stated mission includes public protection. These bars often have
official involvement in proposing lawyer regulation and routinely perform
substantial work for the judiciary. If the mandatory bar’s proposals favor its
members, and the court instinctively defers to the bar’s recommendations,
the public may lose out in this process.
B. CAN MANDATORY STATE BAR DUES PAYMENTS SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY?

Post-Janus, courts considering the constitutionality of compelled
bar dues payments will seemingly need to decide whether such a requirement can survive “exacting scrutiny” or an even higher level of constitutional scrutiny. 114 This will require a finding that the compelled dues serve
“a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” 115 The Supreme Court has
thus far identified the following state interests served by requiring lawyers
to pay state bar dues: the interest in “regulating the legal profession and
improving the quality of legal services” and “a strong interest in allocating
to the members of the bar, rather than the general public, the expense of
ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices.” 116 Even if these state
interests are found to be “compelling,” those interests can almost certainly
“be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms” than compelled dues payments. This is evidenced by looking at
the jurisdictions with voluntary state bars.
The states’ interest in regulating the legal profession can be accomplished without requiring objecting lawyers to pay state bar dues—and
without requiring mandatory state bars. Many states with mandatory bars
have already moved certain lawyer regulatory functions to other entities. In
California, the state legislature voted in 2017 to completely decouple the
Levin, supra note 41.
See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464–65 (2018). Baude and Volokh suggest
an alternative approach, which is to find that mandatory state bars are state agencies and
therefore, government speakers. They argue that bar dues can be viewed as occupational
taxes which can be compelled by the government and do not constrain the government
from speaking. Baude & Volokh, supra note 96, at 196–98. The Supreme Court would
need to reconsider this approach because as Baude and Volokh acknowledge, the
“government agency” argument was rejected in Keller. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 11.
115
See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298,
310 (2012)).
116
Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 655–56 (2014).
113
114
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State Bar of California’s regulatory functions from its other bar functions. 117
The State Bar’s mission is now “to protect the public” and its function is
exclusively regulatory. 118 It collects lawyer licensing fees to fund its regulatory activities. 119 The new voluntary California Lawyers’ Association,
which is “dedicated to the professional advancement of attorneys practicing
in the state of California,” now hosts the state bar sections and offers CLE
and member benefits to dues-paying members. 120 Moreover, there is no reason to think that states with mandatory state bars are better at administering
lawyer regulation than states with voluntary bars. Indeed, some of the most
underfunded and understaffed lawyer discipline systems are in states with
mandatory bars. 121 Conversely, some of the most pro-active and innovative
lawyer regulation is found in states with voluntary state bars. 122
Mandatory state bars are also unlikely to demonstrate that bar dues
payments should be compelled because these organizations help produce
better laws governing lawyers. Even though the mandatory state bars’ mission includes public protection, and several have governing boards that include non-attorney members, there is little evidence that mandatory bars are
significantly more likely than voluntary state bars to propose lawyer regulation that benefits the public. 123 This may be because the boards rarely include more than a handful of lay board members. Moreover, the public
board members are not typically consumer advocates and are sometimes
recommended by lawyer-members of the board. 124
See S.B. 36, 2017–18 Sess. (Cal. 2017).
Our Mission: What We Do, STATE BAR OF CAL., https://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/Our-Mission [https://perma.cc/8EUE-T7BK] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
119
STATE BAR OF CAL., supra note 54 and accompanying text.
120
CAL. LAW. ASS’N, supra note 60.
121
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55, at charts VI, VII, IX–Part A (describing lawyer
discipline statistics in Mississippi).
122
See e.g., Lawyer Self-Assessment Program, COLO. SUPREME COURT, https://
coloradosupremecourt.com/AboutUs/LawyerSelfAssessmentProgram.asp
[https://perma.cc/S6YT-WS3J] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020); PMBR Self-Assessment
Course FAQs, ILL. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM’N, https:/
/registration.iardc.org/attyreg/Registration/Registration_Department/PMBR_FAQs/Regis
tration/regdept/Rule_756e2_Self-Assessment_FAQ_s.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WQZ2HYY3] (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
123
A few mandatory state bars (California, Arizona, Washington, and Utah) have adopted
rules benefiting the public that allow trained non-lawyers to perform limited legal work.
Likewise, only Oregon and Idaho—states with mandatory bars—require lawyers to
maintain malpractice insurance to protect the public. But this may be more due to the
“moralistic” political culture in the West, rather than these states having mandatory bars.
Similar innovations have not been adopted in the South, where there are mostly mandatory
bars but the political culture is more traditional. See Levin, supra note 41, at 26.
124
See, e.g., Bar Seeks a Public Member to Serve on Board of Governors, FLA. B. NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/bar-seeks-a-publicmember-to-serve-on-the-board-of-govenors/ [https://perma.cc/N5BA-N3XV]; 2019–2020
State Bar of Texas Officers, Directors, Liaisons, Section Representatives and Ex Officio,
STATE BAR OF TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutUs/
117
118
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Mandatory state bars are also not demonstrably better than voluntary
bars at “improving the quality of legal services” for the public. Both bars
promote access to justice initiatives. 125 Both provide CLE and other professional development opportunities to improve lawyers’ performance. At
most, mandatory bar supporters might claim that without compelled dues
payments, some lawyers will not belong to any bar organization, which
could adversely affect the quality of legal services those lawyers provide.
This claim is probably true, but its strength is difficult to assess. Some mandatory state bar members currently fail to avail themselves of the bar’s professional development benefits. 126 If lawyers are not compelled to pay state
bar dues, more lawyers might then be able to afford to join a specialty bar,
which could be even more helpful than a state bar in improving competence
in practice. 127 More importantly, it does not appear that jurisdictions with
voluntary state bars (where some lawyers do not belong to any bar association) have more lawyers who perform poorly in practice than states with
mandatory bars. 128
Finally, the state’s interest in having lawyers—and not the public—
pay the cost of ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices can be
achieved without compelling state bar dues payments. In virtually all of the
jurisdictions with voluntary state bars, states use lawyer registration fees,
bar application fees, and other bar-related fees paid by lawyers to pay for
lawyer discipline and other regulation. 129 Lawyer regulatory functions are
performed in those jurisdictions by state entities—other than bars—that are
overseen by the judiciary. Thus, there is another way to achieve the state’s
StateBarPresident/BoardofDirectors/MembersoftheBoard/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/82T4-ZAME] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
125
See, e.g., Access to Justice Campaign, STATE BAR OF MICH., https://www.michbar.org/
programs/ATJCampaign/home [https://perma.cc/637W-EEYJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020);
Access to Justice, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.ohiobar.org/advocacy/access-tojustice/ [https://perma.cc/H4BW-BJXY] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
126
See, e.g., WYO. STATE BAR, 2019 WYOMING STATE BAR SURVEY RESULTS 4 (2019),
https://www.wyomingbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-Bar-Member-Survey-Results.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DHF-YWM5] (indicating that more than 20% of survey respondents
had not used state bar CLE or read its magazine).
127
See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a Site of Professionalism: The Immigration
Bar Example, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194, 206–08, 211–12 (2011) (describing immigration
lawyers who report that membership in the American Immigration Lawyers Association is
essential for staying up-to-date and being a “good” lawyer).
128
While there are no rigorous studies on the comparative efficacy of mandatory versus
voluntary state bars in improving the quality of legal services, the states bear the burden of
satisfying the constitutional standard. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 799–800 (2011) (noting that the state bears the risk of uncertainty and that “ambiguous
proof will not suffice”).
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See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 55 and accompanying text; ABA STANDING COMM. ON
CLIENT PROTECTION, 2014–2016 SURVEY OF LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION
§ II, at 1–2 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/2014_16_survey_of_lawyers_funds_for_client_protection_fin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG4T-FHDE]; ILL. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY
COMM’N, supra note 53, at 50–51 (reporting Illinois lawyer regulator’s sources of revenue).
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interest in having lawyers pay to ensure their adherence to ethical practices
that is significantly less restrictive of lawyers’ associational freedoms than
requiring objecting lawyers to pay bar dues to mandatory state bars.
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that lawyers have been the most vociferous opponents of
mandatory bar dues, but may be the biggest losers if the Supreme Court
concludes that state bar dues payments can no longer be constitutionally
compelled. In that case, the Court may decide that lawyers can opt out of
paying bar dues and bar membership, but that these state bars can otherwise
continue as unified bars. If these bars suffer significant member defections
and lost revenue, states may be forced to move all regulatory functions elsewhere. State bars would lose some power and status, and lawyers may eventually choose to form voluntary state bars. Without mandatory state bars to
initiate regulatory proposals, vet them, and make recommendations, some
states courts would need to become more proactive in identifying issues for
consideration, constituting committees to study them, and making recommendations. This could make the process of regulating lawyers somewhat
more burdensome for the judiciary. But it would also provide an opportunity
for the courts to construct the rulemaking process in ways that more fully
consider the public’s interests and perspectives.

